The domestication of Javier Milei

If you take out the names and mental images of the characters and just present the situation as a matter of fact, it almost seems as if Argentina is in its natural state and not in the midst of something totally disruptive and extraordinary.

President Javier Milei, who is under pressure, given a tough economic situation and multiple accusations of impropriety, is seeking re-election next year. His polling figures show he’s deeply in negative territory but still retains a large core group of followers that make him one of the most attractive political options out there. His political space is riddled with constant infighting at every level, between his close knit inner-circle, internally amongst the key figures of the Cabinet and Congress, and with its nearest allies. The administration has pushed forth with an orthodox austerity plan and artificially held back the value of the US dollar generating a wealth effect for the upper classes, as tourism flocks to Europe, Miami and the Caribbean, while the masses are seeing unemployment and prices rise, making it difficult to make ends meet. Free riding on the popularity of the Argentine National Football team and the best player in the world (Lionel Messi), the government jumped wholeheartedly on the Malvinas issue despite it being somewhat contradictory ideologically, taking the dispute with the United Kingdom to the United Nations. Across the aisle, the opposition is in disarray, fragmented given a power struggle between the old leader and the younger generations that are looking to break free from the subjugation of its aging master.

This picture, with a few touches – such as changing the orthodox austerity to populist expansionism – essentially paints the typical status quo of Argentine politics. Yet, supposedly, we aren’t in a normal situation. The President is Javier Milei, a total outsider who brands himself as an "anarcho-capitalist" libertarian whose main purpose in life is to eradicate any trace of the state. He made it into office with no party structure and essentially the support of his sister, a baker and esoteric character who fans the flames of her brother’s mysticism, particularly by connecting him with his deceased dog, Conan, who apparently transmitted to him a message from God indicating Javier would lead Argentina out of its cycle of decrepitude. During the campaign, Milei promised to torch the Central Bank and dollarise the economy, while promising to “chop off” his own arm if he raised taxes and “blast their heads with a shotgun” if he saw signs of corruption among his officials. He promised “chainsaw austerity” and suggested that if he managed to tame inflation by creating a budget surplus, and then spark economic growth, he would retire to a farmhouse after a single mandate. Milei hasn’t been in a long-term romantic relationship, nor was he at the time of the election, sports a wild mop of hair, is prone to hyperbolic bouts of anger, loves opera, and has a phobia of French fries. In other words, he is totally eccentric.

The mainstream view is that he capitalised on the failures of the Peronist-cum-Kirchnerite and anti-Peronist-cum-Macrista coalitions, leveraging societal anger and disillusionment with the traditional political ecosystem. The fact is that he seemed like an ordinary guy, not a politician, and together with his quirks this made him relatable for a majority of the population, including many former Peronist voters who were or are younger, lower-class citizens of the major urban centres that had been pushed into the gig economy. As an economist, Milei gained notoriety for his aggressive debating on cable news shows, where he would lecture on Austrian economic theory as if it were a revealed truth. He dubbed himself an expert in “economic growth with, and without, money,” convincing the audience that he knew how to solve inflation. His libertarianism also made him a staunch critic of the lockdowns during the Covid-19 pandemic, catapulting his public image, particularly in Buenos Aires City, where he secured his first seat in the Chamber of Deputies alongside Victoria Villarruel, a lawyer who built her career as a dictatorship crimes denier. Milei’s campaigns for Congress, first, and the Presidency, later, were built on social media given his community’s strong, organic digital presence. In the early days of his Presidency I coined the term “synthetic power” to refer to the libertarian’s accumulated political “wealth” which in turn they used to govern and secure support. The key concept was the need to eliminate the political “caste.”

Once in office, Milei and his La Libertad Avanza coalition inked a deal with Mauricio Macri’s coalition, effectively absorbing their presidential ticket, Patricia Bullrich and Luis Petri, into their ranks. Luis 'Toto' Caputo was appointed economy minister and Federico Sturzenegger was named deregulation guru – both prominent members of Macri’s administration under the Cambiemos coalition that included members of the Unión Cívica Radial (UCR) and Elisa 'Lilita' Carrió’s Coalición Cívica. As they pursued their initial set of structural reforms under the omnibus “Ley de bases,” they formed alliances with these sectors and provincial governors, exhibiting political pragmatism. From an economic policy perspective, rather than detonating the Central Bank and killing the “excrement” that was the peso, 'Toto' Caputo led a traditional austerity plan with the rhetorical support of the President and his “chainsaw.”

Slowly but surely, civil war broke out within the ranks of 'mileismo,' with Sister Karina duking it out with controversial political strategist Santiago Caputo over power and control of specific portions of the state. The next chapter was the emergence of a series of corruption allegations that splattered all over the Casa Rosad –  from Javier and Karina Milei, to Santiago Caputo and his multiple lieutenants and potential associates (particularly Leonardo Scatturice), Martín and Eduardo 'Lule' Menem, and former spokesperson and Cabinet Chief Manuel Adorni, to name a few. On the back of the initial success of bringing down inflation, society began to question the Milei administration’s integrity. The social demand for higher wages and jobs began to rise as major causes of concerns, as the economic plan sparked GDP growth concentrated within a few extractivist sectors that aren’t labour-intensive, while services and consumption tanked. While the libertarians won national midterms handily, Buenos Aires Province Governor Axel Kicillof secured an important victory in local elections and the ghost of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was back in the scene.

What happened to Milei the outsider? Was he converted or domesticated by the political ecosystem? Did he change when faced with the opportunity to accumulate power and personal wealth? Maybe his ideas were too far-fetched to realistically execute, particularly in a fragile country and socio-economic situation? It’s probably a combination of all of those, yet what is evident is that Milei has gone through a metamorphosis, becoming exactly what he denounced and betraying his beliefs. While giving speeches and speaking ideologically, Milei appears genuine and has stuck to his guns, namely the Austrian economic school and "anti-wokeism." Yet politically he has taken the traditional playbook of the Argentine politician, with the “Malvinization” of his agenda as the ultimate example. From an economic standpoint, he’s hugged the standard plan of the Argentine right. He will continue to play the outsider card, but no-one will believe him. Indeed, voting and polling figures indicate that his electorate has shifted from cutting across social classes and geographies to a concentration amongst older voters in major urban centres, similar to Macri’s Cambiemos and the traditional anti-Peronist vote.

Will it matter going into next year’s election? According to star Ecuadorean political strategist Jaime Durán Barba, voters in the 21st century are more moved by emotional attachment to a candidate together with their perception that their individual lot will be improved, rather than the ideological rhetoric of the past. Milei does retain his style, which makes him distinct, but he faces the challenge of somehow improving the personal welfare of a majority of the population who are suffering the consequences of his economic plan. In front he has Kicillof, who doesn’t even count on the full support of the Peronists, and not much else. Milei still holds on to his “synthetic power” and controls the levers of the state, so the ball is in his court. The election race is nigh.